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Abstract— Software vulnerability life cycles illustrate changes in 
detection processes of software vulnerabilities during using 
computer systems. Unfortunately, the detection can be made by 
cyber-adversaries and a discovered software vulnerability may be 
consequently exploited for their own purpose. The vulnerability 
may be exploited by cyber-criminals at any time while it is not 
patched. Cyber-attacks on organizations by exploring 
vulnerabilities are usually conducted through the processes 
divided into many stages. These cyber-attack processes in 
literature are called cyber-attack live cycles or cyber kill chains. 
The both type of cycles have their research reflection in literature 
but so far, they have been separately considered and modeled. This 
work addresses this deficiency by proposing a Markov model 
which combine a cyber-attack life cycle with an idea of software 
vulnerability life cycles. For modeling is applied homogeneous 
continuous time Markov chain theory. 
 
Keywords—Markov model, cyber-attack, vulnerability, life 
cycle, homogenous continuous time Markov chain 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Cyber Attack Life Cycle 
 CYBER-ATTACK process which is divided into phases 
can be named a cyber-attack life cycle or a cyber kill chain. 
In cyber security papers, the cyber kill chain is a very popular 
conceptual model generally describing processes of targeted 
cyber-attacks. In research literature cyber-attack life cycles and 
their phases are variously named, defined and described. For 
instance, according to [1] the cycle consists of five stages: 
reconnaissance, scanning, system access, malicious activity and 
exploitation. In [2] the cyber-attack process is named as the 
intrusion kill chain and defined as the sequence of seven stages: 
reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, 
installation, command and control (C2), action. This chain is 
also described by researchers in [3,4]. Other researchers [5] 
point out six stages: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, 
exploitation, installation, C2, objective achievement. These 
authors indicate that an attack on critical infrastructure should 
be considered as a sequence of six phases: reconnaissance, 
weaponization, delivery, cyber execution, control perturbation, 
physical objective realization.  In all available approaches to 
description of cyber-attack life cycles there are not specified an 
initiation and a termination stage. So, a generalized cyber-attack 
life cycle has recently been proposed which includes two 
additional phases [6]. The first stage is an identification of the 
attacker's needs. The last stage of the cyber-attack is a 
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Despite of the fact that in its nature the cyber-attack processes 
are stochastic a few models of the cyber-attack life cycles using 
the theory of stochastic processes have been proposed so far 
[6-8]. 
B. Software Vulnerability Life Cycle 
The life cycle of a software vulnerability can be generally 
divided into several phases that start or end with events: birth, 
creation, discovery, exploit, disclosure, software patch release, 
patch installation. In information security research papers, some 
definitions of software vulnerability life cycles have been 
proposed [9-13]. In [9], one of the first papers, the software 
vulnerability life cycle was defined with following stages:   
• birth - the introduction of a vulnerability at the software 
development stage,  
• discovery - somebody discovered the vulnerability,  
• disclosure - internal dissemination of information in 
circle of people who protect the systems,  
• correction - a patch released,  
• publicity - public disclosure of the vulnerability,  
• scripting - an exploit is available and can be used by 
cyber-attackers,  
• death - the vulnerability identified with the installation 
of the patch. 
Despite the fact that the life cycle of a vulnerability is similarly 
described in the literature, but there are significant differences 
can be found, e.g. in the work [10] an issue and an installation 
of patches are treated alternatively, and both these events close 
the life cycle of the vulnerability. 
In last decade, as a result of research on stochastic nature of life 
cycles of software vulnerabilities, several probabilistic models 
of vulnerability life cycles have been proposed [13-16]. 
Published models are based on Markov processes with 
continuous or discrete time and finite numbers of states. 
B. Aim of Article  
This paper aim is to provide theoretical and analytical 
stochastic model combining both life cycles of a cyber-attack 
and a vulnerability. The proposed model is based on 
homogeneous continues-times Markov chain theory. The 
vulnerability part of the joint life cycle considered in this paper 
generally bases on the idea presented in [9]. For purpose of 
simplicity, stages of the cyber-attack life cycle used here are 
understood as in [1]. It is also assumed that any current phase of 
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a cyber-attack may be abandoned by aggressors or stopped by 
cyber defense systems at any time. Then a new iteration of the 
cyber-attack may begin as long as the vulnerable software is not 
patched. 
II. PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
In the presented model of cyberattack life cycle targeted on 
exploiting a vulnerability, in the part related to the vulnerability, 
the model is based on the idea of a vulnerability life cycle 
described in  [9]. The stages of a cyber-attack are basically 
understood as in [1].  
For purpose of this paper, we assume that behavior of both 
cyber-attack life cycle describing a cyber-attack targeted on a 
vulnerability and vulnerability life cycle fulfill Markov 
property.  So, the stochastic model of a cyber-attack life cycle 
triggered by a software vulnerability is a continues-time Markov 
chain (CTMC) with a finite number of states. The states of the 
stochastic process are relevant stages of the vulnerability and 
cyber-attack life cycle as follows: 
• (𝑆0) Birth – a vulnerability is introduced at the software 
development stage.  
• (𝑆1) Discovered – somebody discovers the vulnerability 
and then internal dissemination of information in circle. 
If the discoverer is someone who protects a system, then 
a patching design process starts. 
• (𝑆2) Disclosed – refers to public disclosure of the 
vulnerability. 
• (𝑆3) Patched – corresponds to the installation of a patch 
or patches. 
• (𝑆4) Reconnaissance – refers to acquiring information 
about targets, targeting process, eventually starting 
weaponization process.  
• (𝑆5) Scanning – scanning a targeted system for 
obtaining specific information about the system’s 
devices, services, users, etc. A zero-day vulnerability is 
identified in targeted software if it is available. Cyber 
weapon design is finished.  
• (𝑆6) System access – once the strategy of cyber-attack 
is finally worked out and a set of cyber weapons is 
prepared the system access step begins. Access to the 
targeted system can be done by e.g. using social 
techniques, direct re-mote access to the system, etc. 
During this stage an initial installation of malicious boot 
code can be done.     
• (𝑆7) Malicious activity – a dynamic command and 
control loop is established with the attackers and 
additional compromising malicious software can be 
downloaded and installed. A feedback about quality and 
performance of a weaponry malicious code is sent back 
to the attacker’s developers for improvements. More 
information about the attacked system is sent back to 
the hostile environment.  
• (𝑆8) Exploitation – final stage of the cyber-attack. More 
malicious activities are conducted to achieve the 
required objectives, e.g. copying and stealing 
information, deleting or changing data, damaging 
operational systems, etc. In this stage from infected 
system the cyber-attacker can launch an attack on other 
systems, remotely or locally.  
 We assume that transition rates between the states of the 
stochastic process are finite and unchanging over time, and the 
generator matrix is known. Thus, basis on the above assumption 
made, the cyber-attack chain are modeled with using 
homogenous continues-time Markov chains. 
III. HOMOGENOUS CONTINUOUS-TIME MARKOV CHAIN  
A continuous-time Markov chain is a stochastic process in 
which the process moves among states and its sojourn time 
spent in each state to visit the next state is independent and 
distributed exponentially [17]. In other words, the property of 
the stochastic process which the conditional probabilities of the 
transitions to the future states depend only on the present state 
and are independent of the history, is called a Markov property. 
The stochastic processes with Markov property at any time are 
Markov processes. 
Let’s consider a continuous-time stochastic process  
{𝑋(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0} with a finite state set 𝑺 =  {𝑆0, 𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑁} and  
note that the event {𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑘 , 𝑡 ≥  0} represents that the 
process is in the state 𝑆𝑘 (𝑘 =  1, 2, … , 𝑁) at time 𝑡 ≥ 0. We 
want to know in which state the process 𝑋(𝑡) is at time 𝑡 ≥ 0 
and the process converges as 𝑡 → +∞.  
If we suppose that the probabilities 𝑃{𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑘  | 𝑋(𝑡0) = 𝑆0,
𝑋(𝑡1) = 𝑆1, … , 𝑋(𝑡𝑛) = 𝑆𝑛} = 𝑃{𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑘  | 𝑋(𝑡𝑛) = 𝑆𝑛} for 
all 𝑆0,  𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛 𝜖 𝑺 and 0 ≤ 𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ … ≤ 𝑡𝑛 ≤ 𝑡  then the 
process  {𝑋(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0} is said to be a continuous-time Markov 
chain.  
If the probability of 𝑋(𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡) being in the state 𝑆𝑘, given that 
𝑋(𝑡) is in the state 𝑆𝑗, is independent of 𝑡 ≥  0, i.e.  
𝑃{𝑋(𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡)  =  𝑆𝑘  | 𝑋(𝑡)  =  𝑆𝑗}  =  𝑃𝑗𝑘(𝛥𝑡), then the process 
{𝑋(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0} has a stationary or homogeneous transition 
probability that depends only on the time difference 𝛥𝑡. The 
process which has this property is said to be a homogeneous 
continuous-time Markov chain. 
Homogeneous continuous-time Markov chains can be analyzed 
by forming and solving Kolmogorov differential equations: 
𝑑
dt
𝑷(𝑡) = 𝑷(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑸      (1) 
with the initial condition 𝑷(0) =  [𝑃0(0
+), 𝑃1(0
+), … , 𝑃𝑁(0
+)],  
where 𝑷(𝑡) = [𝑃0(𝑡), 𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃𝑁(𝑡)], 𝑃𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑃{𝑋(𝑡) =
𝑆𝑘 , 𝑡 ≥  0} (𝑘 =  0, 1, … , 𝑁), 𝑸 is the generator matrix which 
has entries that are the rates at which the process 𝑋(𝑡) jumps 










IV. MARKOV MODEL OF THE LIFE CYCLE 
 The Markov model of a cyber-attack life cycle triggered by a 
software vulnerability (a joint cyber-attack and software 
vulnerability life cycle), is illustrated in Fig.1 as a directed 
graph, i.e. as a Markov graph [17]. 
In the model, in order to finalize a cyber-attack successfully, the 
attack process should pass sequentially through the stages from 
S4 “reconnaissance” to S8 “exploitation” without any 
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possibilities of skipping intermediate stages (see Fig.1). 
Returning to the previous ones are possible. We assume that 
cyber-attacks may be stopped or ended during any stage at any 
time because of a patch installation done. Transition from state 
𝑆2 to state 𝑆3 means that once discovering a vulnerability e.g. 
by a software producer, a patch or patches are developed and 
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Fig. 1. Markov graph of the proposed cyber-attack life cycle model 
The stochastic model is the homogeneous continues-time 
Markov chain {𝑋(𝑡), 0 ≤ 𝑡 < + ∞} with the state space  
𝑺 =  {𝑆0, 𝑆1, … , 𝑆8}. Let λkj be the transition rate from 𝑆𝑘 to 𝑆𝑗 
(𝑘, 𝑗 =  0, 2, … , 8). Then the infinitesimal generator of the 












−𝜆01 𝜆01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −𝜆11 𝜆12 𝜆13 𝜆14 0 0 0 0
0 0 −𝜆22 𝜆23 𝜆24 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −𝜆45 𝜆45 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝜆53 0 −𝜆55 𝜆56 0 0
0 0 0 𝜆63 𝜆64 𝜆65 −𝜆66 𝜆67 0
0 0 0 𝜆73 0 0 0 −𝜆77 𝜆78











where λ11 = λ12 + λ13 + λ13, λ22 = λ23 + λ24, λ55 = λ53 +
λ56, λ66 = λ63 + λ64 + λ65 + λ67,  λ77 = λ73 + λ78,  λ88 =
λ83 + λ84 + λ87 . 
Let 𝑃𝑘(𝑡) (k = 0, 1, …, 8) be the probability of the event 
{𝑋(𝑡)  =  𝑆𝑘} i.e. the probability of that the process 𝑋(𝑡) is in 
the state 𝑆𝑘 at time 𝑡 ≥  0. Thus, the row vector  
𝑷(𝑡)  =  [𝑃0(𝑡), 𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃8(𝑡)] is the probability distribution 
of the process X(t) at time 𝑡 ≥  0. For purpose of this paper we 
assume that process 𝑋(𝑡) at 𝑡 = 0+ starts from state 𝑆1 
“Discovered”. 
In order to calculate the probability distribution 𝑷(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0, 
the Kolmogorov differential equations of the process 𝑋(𝑡) 
should be solved. Laplace transformation particularly is a 
helpful tool to do it. The transformation is also useful to 
calculate some stochastic characteristics of stochastic processes 
[17], e.g. an expected value of total time which process 𝑋(𝑡) 
spends in a state.  
Let the Laplace transformation of the probability  
𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0, denote by 
𝑃𝑘





Thus, by the Laplace transformation of the vector 𝑷(𝑡) we have  
ℒ[𝑷(𝑡); 𝑠] = 𝑷∗(𝑠) = [𝑃0
∗(𝑠), 𝑃1
∗(𝑠), … , 𝑃8
∗(𝑠)]. 
For the given generating matrix Q (see (2)), a Laplace 
transformation of the system of Kolmogorov differential 
equations (1) is: 
s ∙ 𝑷∗(𝑠) − 𝑷(0+) = 𝑷∗(𝑠) ⋅ 𝑸      (3) 
with the initial condition P(0+) = [P0(0+), P1(0+), …, P8(0+)] = 
[0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0].  
Solving the equations (3), we get the transform of 𝑷(𝑡): 
 𝑷∗(𝑠) = 𝑷(0) ⋅ [𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸]−1      (4) 
The solution of equations (4) is collected in Table I, where   
det[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸] = 𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝑠 + 𝜆12 + 𝜆13 + 𝜆14)(𝑠 + 𝜆23 +
𝜆24)((𝜆56(−𝜆45𝜆64 − 𝑠𝜆65 − 𝜆45𝜆65) + (𝑠 + 𝜆45)(𝑠 + 𝜆53 +
𝜆56)(𝑠 + 𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65 + 𝜆67))(𝑠 + 𝜆73 + 𝜆78)(𝑠 + 𝜆83 +
𝜆84 + 𝜆87) + 𝜆78(−𝜆45𝜆56𝜆67𝜆84 − (𝜆56(−𝜆45𝜆64 − 𝑠𝜆65 −
𝜆45𝜆65) + (𝑠 + 𝜆45)(𝑠 + 𝜆53 + 𝜆56)(𝑠 + 𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65 +
𝜆67))𝜆87)) . 
 
TABLE I  
SOLUTION OF KOLMOGOROV EQUATIONS (3) 
P*(s) if P(0+)=[0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0] 
P0*(s) 0 
P1*(s) (𝑠 + 𝜆12 + 𝜆13 + 𝜆14)
−1 












(𝑑𝑒𝑡[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸])−1𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝑠 + 𝜆23
+ 𝜆24))(−𝜆56𝜆65 + (𝑠 + 𝜆53
+ 𝜆56)(𝑠 + 𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65
+ 𝜆67))(−𝜆78𝜆87 + (𝑠 + 𝜆73
+ 𝜆78)(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) 
P5*(s) 
(𝑑𝑒𝑡[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸])−1𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝑠 + 𝜆23
+ 𝜆24))𝜆45(𝑠 + 𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65
+ 𝜆67)(𝜆78(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84)
+ 𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)
+ 𝜆73(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) 
P6*(s) 
(𝑑𝑒𝑡[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸])−1𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝑠 + 𝜆23
+ 𝜆24))𝜆45𝜆56(𝜆78(𝑠 + 𝜆83
+ 𝜆84) + 𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)
+ 𝜆73(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) 
P7*(s) 
(𝑑𝑒𝑡[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸])−1𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝑠 + 𝜆23
+ 𝜆24))𝜆45𝜆56𝜆67(𝑠 + 𝜆83 + 𝜆84
+ 𝜆87) 
P8*(s) 
(𝑑𝑒𝑡[𝑠 ∙ 𝑰 − 𝑸])−1𝑠(𝑠 + 𝜆01)(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝑠 + 𝜆23
+ 𝜆24))𝜆45𝜆56𝜆67𝜆78 
The probabilities 𝑷(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0 can be obtained by performing 
the inverse Laplace transform 𝑷(𝑡) =  ℒ−1[𝑷∗(𝑠); 𝑡] (e.g. see 
section VI). 
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 To assess the losses generated by cyber criminals exploiting 
the vulnerability over a long period of time, it is necessary to 
calculate the total average time spent by attackers at each stage 
of the life cycle of the cyberattack. The calculation can be done 
with using Laplace transform 𝑷∗(𝑠).  
Let 𝑇𝑘 be a mean stay time of the life cycle in the stage 𝑆𝑘 i.e. a 
mean cumulative time while the process {𝑋(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥ 0} stay in 
the state 𝑆𝑘. Let 𝑻𝑆  =  [𝑇0, 𝑇1, … , 𝑇8] be a vector of mean stay 
times in the life cycle stages. To obtain 𝑻𝑠 we need only to 











for 𝑘 =  0, 1, … , 8. 
In other words, 𝑻𝑆 = lim
𝑠→0
𝑷∗(𝑠). The solution of 𝑻𝑆 is shown in 
Table II. 
TABLE II  




T1 (𝜆12 + 𝜆13 + 𝜆14)
−1 




(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝜆23 + 𝜆24))(𝜆56(𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆67) +
𝜆53(𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65 + 𝜆67))(𝜆78(𝜆83 + 𝜆84) +
𝜆73(𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) / 𝜆45 ∙ 𝑀𝑇  
T5 
(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝜆23 + 𝜆24))(𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65
+ 𝜆67)(𝜆78(𝜆83 + 𝜆84)
+ 𝜆73(𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) / 𝑀𝑇   
T6 
(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝜆23 + 𝜆24))𝜆56(𝜆78(𝜆83 + 𝜆84)
+ 𝜆73(𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87)) / 𝑀𝑇  
T7 
(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝜆23 + 𝜆24))𝜆56𝜆67(𝜆83 + 𝜆84
+ 𝜆87) / 𝑀𝑇  
T8 𝜆56𝜆67𝜆78(𝜆12𝜆24 + 𝜆14(𝜆23 + 𝜆24)) / 𝑀𝑇  
𝑀𝑇 = (𝜆12 + 𝜆13 + 𝜆14)(𝜆23 + 𝜆24) ((𝜆56(𝜆63 + 𝜆67) +
𝜆53(𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65 + 𝜆67))(𝜆73 + 𝜆78)(𝜆83 + 𝜆84 + 𝜆87) +
𝜆78 (−𝜆53(𝜆63 + 𝜆64 + 𝜆65 + 𝜆67)𝜆87 − 𝜆56(𝜆63𝜆87 +
𝜆67(𝜆84 + 𝜆87))))  
 
V. EXAMPLE ON APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Traditional risk assessment quantifies risk as the product of 
the probability of an undesirable event leading to specific 
consequences and a measure of the negative impact on the 
organization due to this undesirable event (probabilistic risk 
assessment) [18] or as a triplet of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences [19].    
In this section we use probabilistic risk assessment to 
quantify cyber risks. To do this, we should first calculate the 
probability of each phase of the cyber-attack life cycle, which 
can be determined using the proposed model (for examples see 
section VII).  
We can calculate “risk” traditionally as a product of 
likelihood of threats and their impacts on the assets of an 
organization. To illustrate our approach simply assume that 
 𝑨 = [𝐴0, …𝐴3, 𝐴4 … , 𝐴8], where 𝐴0 = ⋯ = 𝐴3 = 0 and 
𝐴4 … , 𝐴8 ≥ 0 , is a vector of monetary losses of an 
organization’s key assets calculated at each stage of the cyber-
attack life cycle. Then, “total risk score” at time 𝑡 ≥ 0 
represented as a real value function 𝑅(𝑡) can be calculated using 
the following equation: 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑷(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑨𝑇 
where 𝑷(𝑡) = [𝑃0(𝑡), … , 𝑃8(𝑡)], 𝑃𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑃{𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑛}  
(𝑛 =  0, … , 8). 
To calculate the sum of the total risk score 𝑅(𝑡) in a period [0, 𝜏] 
we should calculate the integral ∫ 𝑅(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
. If 𝜏 → +∞ we can 










It is easy to show that for calculation of the total risk score 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡 
there can be applied the Laplace transformation  
𝑅∗(𝑠) = ℒ[𝑅(𝑡); 𝑠]. If we calculate the limit,  lim
𝑠→0
𝑅∗(𝑠) then we 
yield: 
𝑅tot = 𝑻𝒔 ⋅ 𝑨
𝑇 
where the vector  𝑻𝒔  =  [𝑇0, 𝑇1, … , 𝑇8] is given in Table II. 
Of course the proposed model allows us to determine the 
magnitude of the risk of losses at each stage of an cyber-attack 
triggered by an vulnerability during its life cycle.  The risk of 
the cyber-attack stage 𝑘 (𝑘 = 4,… ,8) at time 𝑡 ≥ 0  can be 
expressed as follows:  
𝑅𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑘 ∙ 𝑃𝑘(𝑡) 
The sum of the risk score 𝑅𝑘(𝑡) in a period [0, 𝜏] can be 
calculated as the integral ∫ 𝑅𝑘(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
. For 𝜏 → +∞ we can 
obtain the limit overall risk score at the stage 𝑘 of the cyber-









= 𝐴𝑘 ∙ 𝑇𝑘 
In order to calculate risks at each stage of the cyber-attack 
cycle the stochastic model has to be parameterized. To estimate 
the stationary probabilities, it is necessary and enough to know 
the expected values 1/𝜆𝑘𝑗. The most popular and straight-
forward solution is: 
• to ask experts in cyber security domain to assess the 
values 1/𝜆𝑘𝑗 and to base on their opinion, or  
• to analyze existed empirical data, or  
• a combination of both.  
The process of assessing the expected values is crucial, but it is 
not the primary focus of this article. 
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VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES: PROBABILITIES AND RISK 
SCORE 
A. Example 1 
 In order to illustrate the solution in Table I, simply suppose 
that the transition rates are 𝜆𝑘𝑗 = 𝜆  for  𝑗, 𝑘 = 0, 1, … , 8 and 𝑗 ≠
𝑘. Bases on this assumption, Table III contains the solution of 
(4) and Table IV contains probability distribution  
𝑷(𝑡) = [𝑃0(𝑡), 𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃8(𝑡)] obtained by performing the 
inverse Laplace transformation 𝑷(𝑡) =  ℒ−1[𝑷∗(𝑠); 𝑡] of the 
functions from Table III.  
TABLE III 
SOLUTION OF KOLMOGOROV EQUATIONS (2) WHEN 𝜆𝑘𝑗 = 𝜆 








𝑠2 + 5𝑠𝜆 + 6𝜆2
  
P3*(s) 
𝜆(𝑠5 + 12𝑠4𝜆 + 54𝑠3𝜆2 + 116𝑠2𝜆3 + 126𝑠𝜆4 + 58𝜆5)
𝑠(𝑠6 + 14𝑠5𝜆 + 77𝑠4𝜆2 + 212𝑠3𝜆3 + 307𝑠2𝜆4 + 219𝑠𝜆5 + 58𝜆6)
 
P4*(s) 
𝜆(𝑠4 + 11𝑠3𝜆 + 42𝑠2𝜆2 + 65𝑠𝜆3 + 35𝜆4)
𝑠6 + 14𝑠5𝜆 + 77𝑠4𝜆2 + 212𝑠3𝜆3 + 307𝑠2𝜆4 + 219𝑠𝜆5 + 58𝜆6
 
P5*(s) 
𝜆2(𝑠3 + 9𝑠2𝜆 + 25𝑠𝜆2 + 20𝜆3)
𝑠6 + 14𝑠5𝜆 + 77𝑠4𝜆2 + 212𝑠3𝜆3 + 307𝑠2𝜆4 + 219𝑠𝜆5 + 58𝜆6
 
P6*(s) 
𝜆3(𝑠2 + 5𝑠𝜆 + 5𝜆2)








𝑠6 + 14𝑠5𝜆 + 77𝑠4𝜆2 + 212𝑠3𝜆3 + 307𝑠2𝜆4 + 219𝑠𝜆5 + 58𝜆6
 
 
Bases on results from Table II or Table III the vector 























The vector of the risks scores 𝑅𝑘,𝑡𝑜𝑡 , 𝑘 = 4,… ,8 is as follows: 


















PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 𝑃(𝑡) FOR  𝜆𝑘𝑗 = 𝜆 
P(t) if P(0+)=[0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0] 
P0(t) 0 
P1(t) 𝑒−3𝜆𝑡 
P2(t) 𝑒−2𝜆𝑡 − 𝑒−3𝜆𝑡  
P3(t) 

























































































































In order to calculate the risk scores 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝑅𝑘(𝑡) at time  
𝑡 ≥ 0 the vector of probabilities 𝑷(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0, should be 
calculated. The probabilities 𝑷(𝑡) are obtained by performing 
an inverse Laplace transformation 𝑷(𝑡) =  ℒ−1[𝑷∗(𝑠); 𝑡]. All 
probabilities 𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑘 = 0,1, … ,8 are presented in Table IV. 
B. Example 2 
 In  this example let us consider the cyber-attack with no 
internal iterations (see Fig. 2).   In order to illustrate the solution 
(Table I) simply suppose that the transition rates are:   𝜆01 = 𝜆,  
𝜆12 = 2𝜆, 𝜆13 = 𝜆, 𝜆23 = 2𝜆,  𝜆14 = 𝜆, 𝜆24 = 6𝜆,  𝜆53 =
𝜆63 = 𝜆73 = 𝜆83 = 𝜆,  𝜆45 = 2𝜆, 𝜆56 = 4𝜆, 𝜆67 = 8𝜆, 𝜆78 =
10𝜆 and 𝜆64 = 𝜆65 = 𝜆84 = 𝜆87 = 0. 
Fig. 2. illustrates the model when the returning transitions 
between stages 𝑆8 → 𝑆7, 𝑆4 and  𝑆6 → 𝑆5, 𝑆4 are equal to zero, 



















 λ12=2λ   λ23=2λ
 λ53=λ
λ13=λ









Fig. 2. Markov graph for the life cycle for example 2 
Table V contains the solution of (4) that is the vector of  
𝑷∗(𝑠) =  ℒ [𝑷(𝑡); 𝑠]  the Laplace transformation of the 
probability distribution 𝑷(𝑡) = [𝑃0(𝑡), 𝑃1(𝑡), … , 𝑃8(𝑡)] (see 
Table VI) 
Bases on results from Table V (or Table II)  the vector 𝑻𝒔  =























The vector of the risks scores 𝑅𝑘,𝑡𝑜𝑡 , 𝑘 = 4,… ,8 is as follows: 
















The total risk score 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡 is as follows: 



















In order to calculate the risk scores 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝑅𝑘(𝑡) at time  
𝑡 ≥ 0 the vector of probabilities 𝑷(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥  0 should be 
calculated. The probabilities 𝑷(𝑡) are obtained by performing 
an inverse Laplace transformation 𝑷(𝑡) =  ℒ−1[𝑷∗(𝑠); 𝑡]. 
Probabilities 𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑘 = 0,1, … ,8 are presented in Table VI. 
TABLE V  
SOLUTION OF KOLMOGOROV EQUATIONS (2) WHEN  𝜆01 = 𝜆, 𝜆64 = 𝜆65 =
𝜆84 = 𝜆87 = 0 AND OTHERS 𝜆𝑘𝑗 ≥ 𝜆  








𝑠2 + 12𝑠𝜆 + 32𝜆2
  
P3*(s) 
𝜆(𝑠3 + 15𝑠2𝜆 + 40𝑠𝜆2 + 64𝜆3)




















(((640𝜆5 (𝑠 + 20𝜆))) ⁄ ((𝑠7 + 40𝑠6 𝜆 + 644𝑠5𝜆2
+ 5350𝑠4𝜆3 + 24419𝑠3𝜆4
+ 60130𝑠2𝜆5 + 72136𝑠𝜆6
+ 31680𝜆7))) 
 
TABLE VI  
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 𝑃(𝑡) FOR 𝜆01 = 𝜆, 𝜆64 = 𝜆65 = 𝜆84 = 𝜆87 = 0 
AND OTHERS 𝜆𝑘𝑗 ≥ 𝜆 


















































𝑒−11𝜆𝑡(𝑒𝜆𝑡 − 1)4(−40𝑒𝜆𝑡 − 𝑒2𝜆𝑡 + 56𝑒3𝜆𝑡




𝑒−11𝜆𝑡(𝑒𝜆𝑡 − 1)5(−40𝑒𝜆𝑡 − 21𝑒2𝜆𝑡 + 55𝑒3𝜆𝑡
+ 125𝑒4𝜆𝑡 + 57𝑒5𝜆𝑡 − 8) 
 
The probabilities from Table VI are drawn in Fig. 3 – 5 for 
sample 𝜆 = 1/100.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Example 2. The probabilities 𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑘 =  4, … , 8;  𝜆 = 1 100⁄  
 
 
Fig. 4. Example 2. The probabilities 𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑘 =  1,2,3,8; 𝜆 = 1 100⁄  
 
 
Fig. 5. Example 2. The probabilities 𝑃𝑘(𝑡), 𝑘 =  3,7,8; 𝜆 = 1 100⁄  
CONCLUSION 
 In current literature there can be observed research results of 
software vulnerability life cycles in which a cyber-attack is 
reduced to one stage, i.e. a vulnerability was exploited. In fact, 
exploitation of an vulnerability is a symptomatic result of a 
running or pending cyber-attack that is not an time short event 
but is a process. This work addresses this deficiency by 
proposing the stochastic model of the “specific joint” life cycle 
of cyber-attack and software vulnerability. The model is 
distinguished from these published in the literature in principle 
by combining two approaches which have been researched 
separately so far. The presented research result in this paper 
should be treated as an illustration of the proposed approach of 
considering in one model two correlated phenomena referring 
to vulnerable software. 
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It is well known that nowadays cybercrime is a serious 
problem faced by many organizations both commercial and 
public (e.g. [20,22]). Since cyber burgles operate by day and 
night [23] cyber-defenders are obligated to provide firms’ 
management with cyber risk assessment reports.  It should be  
realized that today the cyber risk assessment should be a 
fundamental element of the risk management system in 
organizations since during the cyber risk assessment process we 
obtain the information indispensable to make right decisions 
concerning the strategy of handling the risk, efficient choice of 
the risk reduction measures, assessment of the transfer validity, 
acceptance or avoidance of the risk. In the author’s opinion, the 
cyber risk assessment as a continuous-time process should be 
built into real-time cyber defense systems in any organization. 
Stochastic models like this proposed in this paper may be an 
important part of cyber defense systems. Such models can be 
also used for building situational awareness of cyber security in  
organizations.   
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